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  This paper develops a stochastic model for comparing payments to U.S. corn producers under 
the U.S. Senate’s Average Crop Revenue Program (ACR) versus payments under the price-
based marketing loan benefit and countercyclical payment programs. Using this model, the 
paper examines the sensitivity of the density function for payments to changes in expected 
price levels. We also assess the impact of the choice of yield aggregation used in the ACR 
payment rate on the mean and variance of farm returns. We find that ACR payments lower the 
producer’s coefficient of variation of total revenue more than does the price-based support, 
although ACR may not raise mean revenue as much. While corn farmers in the heartland 
states might still prefer to receive the traditional forms of support when prices are low relative 
to statutory loan rates and target prices, this outcome is not necessarily the case for farmers in 
peripheral production regions. 
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Two U.S. domestic commodity support programs 
make payments when market prices fall below 
statutory price levels, the latter defined as target 
prices and loan rates. One such support mecha-
nism is the counter-cyclical payment (CCP) pro-
gram (Farm Services Agency 2006b), where the 
price-varying payment is tied to the farm’s his-
torical production levels. Since their inception un-
der the 2002 Farm Act, total annual CCP pay-
ments across all eligible crops have ranged from a 
low of $809 million in fiscal year 2003 to $4.36 
billion in 2006. The other is marketing loan bene-
fits, such as those taken in the form of loan defi-
ciency payments (LDPs) tied to the farm’s current 
production. 
  In early 2008, the U.S. Senate proposed a farm 
bill (the “Food and Energy Security Act of 2007”) 
that would allow the producer the choice of re-
ceiving the traditional suite of Title I commodity 
supports or an alternative, the Average Crop Reve-
nue Program (ACR), which provides a payment 
tied to losses in revenue.
1 The revenue payment 
rate would be based on the difference between a 
target revenue and actual revenue as measured at 
the state level. In principle, the ACR revenue pay-
ment would provide producers protection against 
an unexpected decline in revenues, whether due 
to low yields, low prices, or some combination 
thereof. Protection against low yield is provided 
at least to the extent that the farmer’s yield is 
correlated with state yield. This ACR revenue 
payment would be provided in lieu of CCPs, 
marketing loan benefits, and direct payments (the 
                                                                                    
1 Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE), a revenue-based program 
similar to ACR but with some revisions aimed at lowering potential 
program costs, passed into law (the “Food, Conservation and Energy 
Act of 2008”) in May 2008. 
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latter of which is a lump sum payment). In addi-
tion to the revenue payment, the ACR would pro-
vide the producer with a flat $15 per “base” acre 
(a fixed, historical measure of farm acres), re-
gardless of crop, current prices, or current yields. 
In addition to making payments based on revenue 
loss, the ACR would be novel for permitting the 
producer a choice between two suites of Title I 
programs. One would expect producers to choose 
the program that maximizes their expected utility 
(assuming that one accepts this model of farm 
behavior). 
  While a fair number of studies have been pub-
lished that empirically examine the impacts of 
commodity support on production (e.g., Sckokai 
and Moro 2006, Goodwin and Mishra 2006, An-
ton and Le Mouel 2004, and Hennessy 1998), the 
academic literature is thin on examinations of the 
implication of the empirical distribution of com-
modity support payments for both government 
policy and producer preferences. 
  However, there are a variety of reasons to ex-
amine the probability density function of com-
modity support payment. For example, since 
farmers are generally considered to be risk-
averse, farmer preference for payment programs 
should be expressed over at least the first two 
moments of the payment distribution, i.e., the 
mean and variability of revenue. In addition, of 
relevance to the U.S. government are the higher 
moments of the payment distribution. For exam-
ple, multilateral agreements may place ceilings on 
certain types of U.S. domestic agricultural sup-
port. As such, higher moments of the distribution 
can be suggestive of the probability that such 
ceilings may be exceeded by a proposed support 
program. 
  The goal of this paper is to develop a stochastic 
model for estimating potential ACR revenue sup-
port payments to U.S. corn producers that can be 
used to address policy issues, such as the two 
above, that relate to the empirical distribution of 
federal commodity support. Before turning to the 
model, we provide a brief background on the 





Under Section 1401 of the 2007 Senate Farm Bill, 
the qualifying producer would be allowed a one-
time election in any one of the 2010 through 2012 
crop years to receive the ACR revenue and fixed 
payments starting in the year of election, in lieu 
of receiving direct payments, marketing loan bene-
fits, and counter-cyclical payments (CCPs). The 
fixed payment component of the ACR is $15 per 
acre times 100 percent of the base acres on the 
farm for all covered crops. 
  The ACR revenue payment for the producer of 
a program commodity in year t is triggered when 
90 percent of the average crop revenue program 
guarantee (RPG) is greater than the actual state 
revenue (ASR) for that commodity. The ACR 
revenue payment (denoted as ACR) to producer i 
of crop j in period t is 
 
(1a) ACRijt = max{ 0, (0.90 · RPGtj − ASRtj )} 







 · 0.90· (
B
ij A  · 0.85) , 
 
where RPGtj is the product of the average crop 
revenue pre-planting price, 
R
tj P , and the state ex-
pected yield, E(YStj). This latter value is esti-
mated using a linear trend yield regression for the 
state yield data over the period 1980 to 2006.
2 
Actual state revenue ASRtj is the product of the 
Federal Crop Insurance harvest price, Ptj, and the 
actual state yield per planted acre, YStj. 
 The  value 
B
ij A  is the farm-specific “base” acre-
age for the program crop, i.e., a historical value 
calculated as per government rules (Farm Ser-
vices Agency 2006a). In another departure from 
what one might expect in a traditional insurance 
instrument, the average crop revenue planting 
price, 
R
tj P , is the average of the current as well as 
the past two years’ Federal Crop Insurance pre-
planting prices. Furthermore, in the case of each 
of the 2011 through 2012 crop years, the legisla-
tion bounds the maximum percentage changes 
in
R
tj P  at not more than +/-15 percent from  1,
R
tj P− . 
 The 
APH
ij Y  is either (i) the actual production his-
tory (production/acre) of the producer as used to 
calculate the producer’s crop insurance under the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program, or (ii) a “com-
parable yield” determined by USDA in the case 
                                                                                    
2 The legislation contains provisions for substituting alternative values 
for expected state yield in the cases where the USDA cannot “estab-
lish” the expected yield using the trend regression, or where the ex-
pected yield based on the trend regression is negative.  Cooper  Payments under the Average Crop Revenue Program   51 
 
 
where the actual production history is not avail-
able. The latter provision may be necessary to 
make a payment calculation in the case where i 
has not produced the crop in recent years. Hence, 
receiving the ACR revenue payment does not 
necessarily require current production, but recent 
production history can affect the payment level. 
The ratio  /( )
APH
ij tj YE Y S  can be interpreted as 
moral hazard adjustment, albeit one regarding 
past actions. 
  In contrast to the ACR revenue payment, 
counter-cyclical payments (CCP) are established 
using a payment rate determined by shortfalls in 
an “effective” price with respect to a statutory 
target price, multiplied by the fixed base acreage 
and base yield. In other words, current production 
of the commodity is not required for the producer 
to receive a CCP payment. The total CCP option 
for a producer i of crop j in year t would be cal-
culated over 2008 to 2012 as 
 
(1b) P-CCPijt = 0.85 
  · max{ 0, (TPj − [Max (NPjt, LRj)] − Dj) } 
 ·  (
B
ij A  · 
B
ij Y ), 
 
where  TPj,  LRj, and Dj  are the statutory per 
bushel target price, national average loan rate, 
and direct payment rate, respectively, for a cov-
ered crop as specified in the farm legislation.
3 For 
each covered crop, NPjt is a national market price 
(season average price for the marketing year), and 
B
ij A  and 
B
ij Y  are farm-specific base acreage and 
yield, respectively, i.e., where the latter is calcu-
lated as per government rules (Farm Services 
Agency 2006a) as with the base acres discussed 
earlier. While the acreage and yield values in 
equation (1b) are fixed, the payment rate itself is 
a function of contemporary season prices. 
 For  farmer  i of a crop in region j in time t, the 
existing price-based marketing loan benefit, or 
equivalently in terms of value, the loan deficiency 
payment, is calculated as 
 
(1c) LDPijt = max{0, (LLRjt − ALRjt)} · Aijt·Yijt , 
 
                                                                                    
3 An exception to the average national loan rates for the purposes of 
CCP is made for rice and barley, for which the Secretary of Agriculture 
would determine the average loan rates. 
where the statutorily-set local loan rate (LLR) is 
the national loan rate (LR) adjusted by various 
region-specific (county or other region) and qual-
ity factors. Under the 2002 Farm Act, the alterna-
tive loan repayment rate, or ALR, is essentially a 
USDA-determined market price that varies daily 
or weekly (depending on the crop) according to 
market conditions, and is adjusted to reflect qual-
ity of the product. Depending on the crop, the 
ALR may be a county (wheat, feed grains, oil-
seeds), national (peanuts), or world (upland cot-
ton and rice) “posted” price. The payments are 
applied to current production on each farm, which 
equals harvested area, A, times yield, Y. 
  From the producer’s perspective, a potential 
benefit, or liability, of the ACR over the LDP and 
the CCP is that the ACR’s target revenue auto-
matically rebalances itself to recent market prices. 
Therefore, it can provide payments in situations 
in which market prices are well above statutory 
loan rates and target prices. Of course, when 
market prices are low relative to loan rates and 
target prices, the ACR can be expected to provide 
lower mean benefits than the LDP plus the CCP 
(albeit leaving differences in the fixed payments 
out of the analysis). 
 
 
Methodology for Estimating the Density 
Function for Program Payments 
 
The only two stochastic variables that we explic-
itly need for calculating program payments at the 
national level are realized yield and season aver-
age price, although other variables can usefully 
feed into the econometric analysis, both to reduce 
omitted variable bias, and as intercept-shifting 
terms that can be useful for policy simulations. 
For the simulation of payments, then, we need to 
generate the distributions of price and yield. 
However, the procedure for doing so is consid-
erably complicated by the fact that price and yield 
are correlated, and hence the estimated distribu-
tions must take this correlation into account. We 
estimate the density function for payments given 
(i) econometric estimates of the historical relation-
ship between national price and national average 
yield, (ii) estimates of the distribution of yield 
density for a particular base year, and (iii) a boot-
strap approach that links (i) and (ii). 52    April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Modeling the Price-Yield Relationship Using 
Price and Yield Deviates 
 
Our focus is on estimating the distribution of 
payments for a given reference crop year t, given 
that at pre-planting time in t, season average 
prices and realized yield are stochastic. As such, 
sector-level modeling that separately identifies 
supply, demand, and storage is unnecessarily com-
plex to serve our needs and diverts attention away 
from the focus of this paper. A convenient way to 
address our questions is to model prices and yield 
as percentage deviations of realized prices and 
yields at the end of the season from the expected 
values at the beginning of the season when 
planting decisions are made. If one accepts that 
the observed distribution of percentage changes 
in price and yield between pre-planting and har-
vest are representative of their future distribution, 
then our econometric specification of the price-
yield relationship can be reduced to one equation. 
  While the academic literature is rich with pa-
pers on price estimation for commodities [e.g., 
see Goodwin (2002) for an overview], few ex-
press prices in deviation form. One example that 
does is Lapp and Smith (1992), albeit as the dif-
ference in price between crop years rather than 
between pre-planting time and harvest within the 
same crop year. As price deviation in their paper 
was measured between years, yield change was 
not included in that analysis. Paulson and Bab-
cock (2007) provide a rare example of the exami-
nation of the price-yield relationship within a 
season in an examination of crop insurance. Like 
them, for the purposes of estimating the relation-
ship between price and yield, we re-express the 
historical price and yield data as proportional 
changes between expected and realized price and 
expected and realized yield within each period, 
respectively. We can then apply this history of 
proportional changes in yield and price to 2005 
data to develop the distribution of payments. 
However, among the differences in our approach 
from that in Babcock and Paulson (2007) is that 
ours uses a modeling approach that easily permits 
multiple explanatory variables, thereby decreas-
ing the chance of misspecification of the price-
yield relationship, and permitting sensitivity analy-
sis with respect to parameters of policy interest. 
  For the model, the realized national average 
yield, Yt , is transformed to the yield deviation ∆Yt 
according to ∆Yt = [Yt – E(Yt)] / E(Yt). The ex-
pected value of Yt, or E(Yt), is calculated from an 
estimated trend equation (as described below). To 
generate a distribution for Y2005 based on histori-
cal yield shocks, the historical yields must be de-
trended to reflect the proportional change in the 
state of technology between that in 2005 and that 
in time t, i.e., Yit is detrended to 2005 terms as 
 
(2)  2005 ()  ( 1 )
d
it i it YE Y Y = ∆+,∀i counties, 
     t periods, t ≠ 2005. 
 
It is convenient to specify the yield deviate as the 
deviation of detrended yield from expected yield 
in the base year used for detrending, which we 
denote as 
d
t Y ∆ . We detrend yield based on the 
standard practice of using a linear trend regres-
sion for yield. 
 As with yield, price is transformed into 
deviation form, i.e., the realized price at harvest, 
Pt, is the difference between the expected and 
realized price, or ∆Pt = [Pt – E(Pt)] / E(Pt). The 
derivation of E(Pt) is discussed further in the data 
section. 
  Given the estimated trend yields as the predic-
tions of E(Yt), we can construct 
d
t Y ∆  and esti-
mate the relationship between ∆Pt and 
d
t Y ∆ . In 
particular, we assume that ∆Pt can only be par-
tially explained by 
d
t Y ∆ , and that the uncertainty 
in this relationship can be incorporated into the 
empirical distribution. We do so by specifying 
∆Pt as 
 
(3)  ∆Pt =  (, )
d
tt g Yz ∆  + εt , 
 
where  εt is i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance 
2
ε σ  
given{ , }
d
tt Yz ∆ , and where zt is a vector of other 
variables that may explain the price deviation. We 
expect that d∆Pt / d∆
d
t Y  < 0, i.e., the greater the 
realization of national average yield over the ex-
pected level, the more likely harvest time price 
will be lower than expected price. 
 
Generating the Empirical Distribution of 
Payments—Overview 
 
To generalize our empirical distribution of pay-
ments, we use a bootstrap method that allows for 
flexible right-hand-side regression modeling and Cooper  Payments under the Average Crop Revenue Program   53 
 
 
for modeling interactions between variables. In 
particular, we use a paired bootstrap approach in 
a resampling methodology that involves drawing 
i.i.d. observations with replacement from the 
original data set (Efron 1979, Yatchew 1998), 
maintaining the pair-wise relationship in each ob-
servation between the variables, e.g., variable 
values yi and xi are always kept together as a row. 
The bootstrap data-generating mechanism is to 
treat the existing data set of size T as a population 
from which G samples of size T are drawn. Equa-
tion (3) is re-estimated for each of these boot-
strapped data sets. Variation in estimates results 
from the fact that upon selection, each data point 
is replaced within the population. We can use this 
standard bootstrap to generate a distribution of 
∆P given ∆Y
d.  
  However, while we can directly estimate  ˆ
gt P ∆ , 
g = 1,…,G, by substituting the G sets of boot-
strapped coefficients and the (T × 1) vector 
d
t Y ∆  
into equation (3), to compensate for the limited 
sample size we can increase the smoothness of 
the bootstrapped distribution of ∆P by substitut-
ing 
d
t Y ∆  with yield deviations—denoted as 
∆Y
d*—that are generated from a random sample 
drawn from an estimated yield distribution using 
a kernel approach described in the next section. 
Doing so will allow us to estimate a set of price 
shocks associated with an arbitrarily large set of 
yield shocks, albeit defined by the actual data. 
While smoothing the distribution of yield will of 
course reduce the coefficient of variation of yield, 




Smoothing the Distribution of Yield 
 
Like Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) and 
Goodwin and Ker (1998), we utilize the non-
parametric kernel-based probability density func-
tion (Härdle 1990, Silverman 1986) for generat-
ing a smoother yield density than that which 
                                                                                    
4 As a supplement to the modeling results based on the kernel density 
for yield, the appendix presents alternative results for two of the key 
output tables based on generating the yield densities without any 
smoothing. In particular, the block bootstrap (Lahiri 1999) approach is 
used to randomly resample with replacement the national, state, and 
county yields from the actual yield dataset. Year-wise relationships 
among the yield values are maintained when resampling, thereby en-
suring that the simulated dataset has the same correlation between the 
national, state, and county yields as the original data. 
would be supplied by the bootstrap of equation 















∑ , j = 1,…,J. 
 
This function allows us to generate values of ∆Y
d 
from a distribution that approaches a continuous 
function as J approaches infinity. This function 
gives support to generating yield values over the 
observed range of detrended yields, i.e., the (J × 
1) vector y
d is drawn over the range {min(
d
t Y )… 
max(
d
t Y )},  t = 1…T, where 
d
i y  are the yield 
points for which the density function is estimated. 
The function K(.) is a Gaussian kernel (ibid.).
5 
The optimal bandwidth h for smoothing the den-
sity is calculated according to equation 3.31 in 
Silverman (1986), which is a common choice for 
single mode densities such as those being evalu-
ated here. We simulate the yield distribution by 
taking N draws of yield values, denoted as 
* d
n Y , 
from the estimated kernel density, with the yield 
draws denoted as 
* d
n Y ∆ . Given the expected 
(trend) yield for a reference year, the yield devi-
ate 
* d
n Y ∆  is calculated for each 
* d
n Y . 
 
Imposing Estimated Yield Correlations on 
Simulated Yield Data 
 
Prices are decided based on national-level yield 
shocks. ACR payments are a function of state-
level yield shocks. In this case, the representative 
farmer’s distribution of revenue is estimated at 
the county level. Hence, in addition to simulating 
national yield ∆Y
d*, we simulate state and county 
yields using the same kernel approach as above. 
Of course, as drawn, these simulated national, 
state, and county yields, being i.i.d., do not have 
the same Pearson correlation matrix as the origi-
nal actual yield data, even if they have the correct 
mean and variances. 
  To maintain correct spatial relationships be-
tween the yield measures, the observed correla-
tions between the national-, state-, and county-
level yields need to be imposed on the simulated 
yields, but without changing the mean and vari-
                                                                                    
5 We found the estimated density of program payments for corn to be 
insensitive to the choice between Gaussian and biweight kernels. 54    April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
ance of each yield vector. This is done by apply-
ing nonparametric Monte Carlo techniques to the 
three simulated yield vectors in order to induce 
them to have the same correlations as the actual 
yield data. Specifically, heuristic combinatorial 
optimization (Charmpis and Panteli 2004) was 
used to rearrange the generated univariate i.i.d. 
yield samples, in order to obtain the desired Pear-
son’s correlation between them while leaving the 
yield values unchanged. 
 
Generating the Empirical Distribution of 
Payments Given the Estimated Yield Distribution 
 
The estimated price shocks given ∆Y
d* and the 
coefficient estimates from the bootstraps of equa-





d P Y ∆= β + β ∆   , 
 
where ∆Y
d* is the N × 1 vector of yield shocks 
derived from the kernel yield distribution,  1 β   is 
the (1 × G) vector of draws of the coefficient on 
the yield deviate from the regression bootstraps, 
and  0 β   is the product of the bootstrap draws of 
the other bootstrapped coefficients times the as-
signed values of the explanatory variables in z, 
i.e., given K–1 explanatory variables in z (inclu-
ding the constant), the values in  0 β   are 
 







β= β ∗ ∑  , 
 
for g = 1,…,G. The resulting 
* P ∆   is an (N × G) 
matrix, i.e., every yield shock 
* d
n Y ∆  is associated 
with a (1 × G) distribution of price shocks. For 
our simulation, N = G = 1000. 
  To calculate the program payments, 
* P ∆   must 
be transformed to back the price per bushel,
* P  . 
For a reference year, say 2006, the simulated 
price per bushel is 
*2006
gn P   = E(P2006) ⋅ (
*2006
gn P ∆   + 1), 
g = 1,…,G, n = 1,…,N. Finally, by substituting 
the vectors 
2006* P ∆   and 
2006 * d Y ∆  into equations (1a) 
through (1c), we generate the probability density 
functions for the 2006 payment distributions as 
seen from the beginning of the 2006 crop year. 
  Parameters used in the CCP calculations are the 
H.R. 2419 corn loan rate of $1.95 per bushel 
(used in the LDP calculation as well), direct pay-
ment rate of $0.28 per bushel, target price of 
$2.63 per bushel, and program yield of 114.4 per 
bushel per acre. 
 
Data 
Data on planted yields and acres for corn are sup-
plied by the National Agricultural Statistics Ser-
vice (NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. As support payments can be collected for 
corn for silage as well as corn for grain, and be-
cause silage can be a significant portion of corn 
production in some regions outside the heartland, 
we merge together data on corn for grain and 
corn for silage. We convert tons of silage to bush-
els using a conversion rate of 7.94 bushels per 
ton, as per the Farm Services Agency (2006a). 
 Realized  prices  Pt are the harvest-time price of 
the December Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
futures contract for corn, t = 1975,…,2005.
6 For 
the expected value of price Pt, or E(Pt), we utilize 
a non-naive expectation, namely the average of 
the daily February prices of the same CBOT con-
tract. While we have prices back to 1969, the data 
before the mid-1970s does not reflect China and 
Russia as regular participants in global grain mar-
kets, and is unlikely to be representative of con-
temporary global markets. 
  In addition to the yield shock, we include sev-
eral other explanatory variables in our regression 
of equation (3). The dummy variable FarmAct 
takes the value of “1” for years 1996 and above 
(and 0 otherwise), reflecting the federal govern-
ment being out of the commodity storage busi-
ness under recent Farm Acts.
7 As commodity 
storage may be expected to have a stabilizing in-
fluence on futures prices (Tomek and Gray 1970), 
we include the corn stocks to use ratio, as meas-
ured at the beginning of the crop year, in order to 
maintain equation (3) in reduced form. As the 
inflation rate may impact price variability (e.g., 
Lapp and Smith 1992), we include the inflation 
rate (CPI-U) over the quarter immediately prior to 
planting, the idea being that a lag may exist in the 
impact of near-term inflation on the commodity 
price, with a higher rate increasing the price 
shock.  
                                                                                    
6 For certain federal crop insurance products, USDA’s Risk Man-
agement Agency uses a smoothed November price of the December 
contract as the harvest time price for corn.  
7 This variable might be interpreted as the change in the weather 
premium after the 1996 Farm Act. Cooper  Payments under the Average Crop Revenue Program   55 
 
 
  To model international linkages in a reduced 
form, we include deviation of actual yield from 
expected yield of corn in time t in the rest of the 
world, as calculated from FAOSTAT data. To 
account for the difference in the timing of seasons 
north and south of the equator, this variable is 
disaggregated into northern and southern hemi-
spheres. The expectation is that a negative yield 
shock in the rest of the world will increase the 
U.S. corn harvest time price relative to the ex-
pected price. Finally, as exchange rate changes 
can be expected to have an impact on corn ex-
ports (Babula, Rupple, and Bessler 1995), we 
include the percentage change in the nominal 
exchange rate between planting time and harvest, 
where the expectation is that an increase in this 
value lowers the export demand for U.S. corn, 




Table 1 provides the econometric results for a 
linear specification of equation (3). The coeffi-
cient on ∆Y is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Of the additional explanatory variables, stocks/use, 
π, and ∆r are significant to at least the 10 percent 
level. A semi-nonparametric (SNP) specification 
of equation (3) was also examined, and the rela-
tionship d∆P / d∆Y was found not to be statisti-
cally different than for the parametric specifica-
tion in Table 1.
8 
 
Discussion of Payment Simulation Results 
 
For the simulation, two regions are selected, one 
with a relatively low correlation (0.457) of state 
yield with national yield (North Dakota) and one 
with a relatively high correlation (0.906) with 
national yield (Illinois). The lowest level of ag-
                                                                                    
8 To examine the potential for bias due to misspecification in estimat-
ing equation (3), in addition to a linear parametric estimate of the 
equation, we also estimated the equation using a semi-nonparametric 
(SNP) econometric approach based on the Fourier transformation 
(Fenton and Gallant 1996). The SNP regression is limited by degrees 
of freedom in the number of variables that can receive the SNP treat-
ment, and as such, the SNP regression variables in our application are 
limited to ∆Y and its first-order sine and cosine transformations. Using 
the regression results in a bootstrap-based test (Efron 1987), the hy-
potheses Ho: 
para para dP dY ∆∆ − 
snp snp
tt dP dY ∆∆ = 0 cannot be 
rejected at the 90 percent level or better for all j ≠ k. This result sug-
gests that the parametric model is adequate to the task of modeling the 
interaction between price and yield, but with the additional benefit of 
allowing additional explanatory variables. 
gregation used here is the county, where we as-
sume a representative farmer whose yield distri-
bution is the counties’ (Barnes County in North 
Dakota and Logan County in Illinois) yield distri-
bution. For both regions, the correlation of state 
yield with the yield of the chosen counties is 
similar, thereby simplifying the interpretation of 
the payment simulation results. Table 2 shows the 
similarity of the Pearson correlation coefficients 
for the actual yield data and the simulated data for 
the chosen regions. 
  For the two regions, two price scenarios are 
examined. One is a relatively low market price 
scenario in which the CCP and marketing loan 
benefits have significant probability of providing 
payments given current loan rates and target prices, 
and one a relatively high market price scenario 
that has insignificant probability of producing 
CCP payments and marketing loan benefits. 
  The lower price scenario uses an ACR revenue 
pre-planting price that would have been calcu-
lated for 2006, or $2.58 per bushel, which is the 
average of the 2004 through 2006 February val-
ues of the December futures contract ($2.83, $2.32, 
and $2.59, respectively). The cash price at pre-
planting in 2006 was $2.07 (February Central Illi-
nois cash price for yellow No. 2). 
  The higher price scenario uses an ACR revenue 
pre-planting price that would have been calcu-
lated for 2009, or $4.27 per bushel, which as-
sumes that the February 2009 price of the De-
cember futures contract falls by 21 percent over 
that in February 2008.
9 Assuming a basis of -0.30 
(the average of the last ten years), the associated 
February 2009 cash price is thus $3.97. In this 
higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting 
price is $4.58, which is the average of $4.27 and 
the $4.06 and $5.40 February prices for 2007 and 
2008, respectively. 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics for the pay-
ment distributions under both price scenarios. In 
the low price scenario for Logan County, the 
mean ACR payment of $5 per acre is notably 
lower than the mean LDP+CCP payment of $53 
per acre, where we denote all marketing loan 
benefits as LDPs for brevity. The reason is that 
the LDPs and CCPs do not automatically com- 
                                                                                    
9 The 21 percent represents one of the largest percentage price drops 
between successive Februaries witnessed between 1969 and 2008, and 
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Table 1. Regression Results and Sample Statistics for the Function Explaining ∆Pt  
Variable Coefficient    T-statistic  Variable Mean  Variable Std. Error 
Constant -0.247  (-4.035)  1  0 
∆Yt  -1.512 (-6.161)  -0.02836  0.08141 
FarmAct  -0.014 (-0.321) 0.3226 0.4752 
Stocks to use ratio   0.229 (1.743)  0.2307 0.1522 
SH
t Y ∆   -0.193 (-0.398)  0.0002463  0.03756 
NH
t Y ∆   -0.179  (-0.871) 0.002486 0.09894 
π 10.205  (2.883)  0.009463  0.005721 
∆rt  -0.424  (-1.997) 0.005123 0.09043 
Ln–L  33.599      
R
2  0.720      
Notes: ∆Yt is the percentage deviation in U.S. corn yields from the expected (trend) yield. Stocks to use ratio is the ratio of total 
U.S. corn stocks at the end of the previous crop year to total utilization of U.S. corn (Economic Research Service 2007). FarmAct 
equals 1 for 1996 to 2005 and 0 otherwise. 
NH
t Y ∆  is the percentage deviation in northern hemisphere corn yield (less the United 
States) from the trend yield in that world region, and 
SH
t Y ∆  is the percentage deviation in southern hemisphere corn yield (less the 
United States) from the trend yield in that world region (constructed using data from the FAOSTAT website). π is the inflation 
rate (CPI-U) over the quarter prior to planting.  t r ∆ is the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate (Euro/$) between 
planting and harvest time. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Actual and Simulated Corn Yield Per Acre (1975 to 2007) for 
Two Counties
a 
Statistic  Actual Data  Simulated Data
b 
LOGAN COUNTY, IL        
Pearson’s Correlation  National  Illinois  Logan County  National  Illinois Logan  County 
  National  1    1    
  Illinois  0.891 1    0.882 1   
  Logan  County 0.701 0.867  1  0.701 0.859  1 
Mean  147.4 155.7 171.9 143.0 153.0  170.88 
Std.  Dev.  13.7 21.8 27.4 10.7 19.2 24.5 
BARNES COUNTY, ND        
Pearson’s Correlation  National  North Dakota  Barnes Co.  National  North Dakota  Barnes Co. 
  National  1    1    
  North  Dakota  0.483 1    0.483 1   
  Barnes  County 0.373 0.882  1  0.373 0.882  1 
Mean  147.4 97.18 115.2 143.0  96.7  114.1 
Std.  Dev.  13.8 25.4 35.2 10.7 24.3 31.4 
a The statistics are for yields of corn for grain detrended to a 2006 basis. National and county yields are yields per harvested acre, 
and state yields are yields per planted acreage (as needed for ACR calculations). 
b Simulated yields are generated from kernel density functions, and correlations between the simulated yields are imposed using 
heuristic combinatorial optimization techniques. 
 
pensate for the “natural hedge,” i.e., the inverse 
correlation, between price and yield, which is 
strong for the Illinois farmer but not the North 
Dakota farmer. Hence, while the mean ACR pay-
ment is lower than the LDP+CCP payment for the 
Barnes County farmer as well, at $15 versus $31, 
the difference is notably smaller. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for the Distribution of Commodity Payments for Corn for Two Price 
Scenarios 
  Total payments per acre ($) 




90% Confidence Interval 
(lower, upper) 
Frequency of Payment 
(percent) 
A1. BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA (2006 CASH PRICE SCENARIO OF $2.07) 
LDP   11  3  15  1.377  0  41  55 
CCP   20  26  9  0.437  0  26  91 
LDP+CCP    31 29 20  0.662  0  67  91 
ACR   15  0  25  1.705  0  71  40 
B1. LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS (2006 CASH PRICE SCENARIO OF $2.07) 
LDP   16  5  20  1.294  0  57  55 
CCP  37 48 16  0.437  0  48  91 
LDP+CCP    53 53 32  0.601  0  105  91 
ACR   5  0  13  2.497  0  32  27 
A2. BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA (HIGHER CASH PRICE SCENARIO OF $3.97) 
no LDP and CCP payments at this price level 
ACR  40 15 52  1.293  0  149  58 
B2. LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS (HIGHER CASH PRICE SCENARIO OF $3.97) 
no LDP and CCP payments at this price level 
ACR  34 28 34  0.986  0  98.7  78 
a The coefficient of variation measure is not denominated in dollars. 
Notes: When the cash price at pre-planting in 2006 is $2.07/bu., the price scenario uses a revenue pre-planting price that would 
have been calculated for 2006, or $2.58/bu., which is the average of the 2004 through 2006 February values of the December fu-
tures contract ($2.83, $2.32, and $2.59, respectively).  
  When the cash price at pre-planting is $3.97, the February price of the December futures contract is assumed to be $4.27. In this 
higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting price is $4.58, which is the average of the hypothetical $4.27 and the 2007 and 
2008 February futures values ($4.06 and $5.40, respectively). 
 
  In the higher price scenario, no LDP+CCPs are 
made of course, but the ACR still provides reve-
nue payments, as shown in Table 3. By that same 
token, the ACR can represent significant budget-
ary outlays for the government when prices are 
high. 
  In the lower price scenario, the 90 percent up-
per tail of payments for Logan County is signifi-
cantly lower for the ACR than for LDP+CCP, at 
$32 per acre versus $105 per acre as shown in 
Table 3. For this same price scenario, the 90 per-
cent upper tail of payments for Barnes County is 
approximately the same for the ACR and the 
LDP+CCP. Nonetheless, at the low price levels 
where a comparison can be made between ACR 
and LDP+CCP, the other heartland states should 
have payment results similar to Illinois. As these 
states account for the bulk of U.S. corn produc-
tion, if the ACR program replaced the LDP+CCP 
as the sole source of variable program support 
under Title I, it would likely result in significantly 
lower probability of high budgetary outlays than 
the LDP+CCP when prices are relatively low. 
  Table 4 shows the impact of the payments on 
total revenue per acre (gross revenue plus the 
payment) of the farm for both the low and high 
price scenarios, assuming that the producer is in 
fact farming the base acre. In analyzing the simu-
lation output, row-wise correspondence is main-
tained between the payments and gross revenue 
calculations in order to correctly characterize the 
density of total revenue, i.e., variance (total reve-
nue) = var (payment + gross revenue), not var 
(payment) + var (gross revenue). 
  As the third to last column of Table 4 shows 
for either price scenario, the ACR program re- 58    April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Impacts of Commodity Payments on Revenue per Acre under the Two Price Scenarios 
  Total Revenue per Acre 












Interval (lower, upper) 
A. BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA 
Gross revenue  2.07  222  218  60  0.270  --  126  332 
CCP+LDP + GRev  2.07  253  250  64  0.252  7  145  366 
ACR + GRev  2.07  237  226  48  0.203  25  178  332 
Gross revenue  3.97  427  418  115  0.270  --  241  637 
CCP+LDP + GRev  3.97  no impact            
ACR + GRev  3.97  467  444  86  0.185  31  364  639 
B. LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
Gross revenue  2.07  333  334  43  0.128  --  259  401 
CCP+LDP + GRev   2.07  386  393  47  0.122  5  293  447 
ACR + GRev   2.07  338  335  37  0.110  14  292  403 
Gross revenue  3.97  639  640  82  0.128  --  496  769 
CCP+LDP + GRev   3.97  no impact            
ACR + GRev   3.97  673  668  62  0.093  28  589  779 
Notes: “GRev” is gross revenue per acre. 
  When the cash price at pre-planting in 2006 is $2.07/bu., the price scenario uses a revenue pre-planting price that would have 
been calculated for 2006, or $2.58/bu., which is the average of the 2004 through 2006 February values of the December futures 
contract ($2.83, $2.32, and $2.59, respectively).  
  When the cash price at pre-planting is $3.97, the February price of the December futures contract is assumed to be $4.27. In 
this higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting price is $4.58, which is the average of the hypothetical $4.27 and the 2007 and 
2008 February futures values ($4.06 and $5.40, respectively). 
 
 
duces the coefficient of variation of revenue for 
the Barnes County farmer more than it does for 
the Logan County farmer, but the difference is 
most notable in the low price scenario. In addi-
tion, the decrease in the coefficient of variation 
with the ACR relative to that with the CCP+LDP 
is greater for Barnes County than for Logan 
County. For the $2.07 price scenario for Barnes 
County, adding the CCP+LDP payments to gross 
revenue decreases the coefficient of variation of 
revenue by 7 percent, but adding the ACR pay-
ment instead reduces the coefficient of variation 
by 25 percent. For the $2.07 price scenario for 
Logan County, adding the CCP+LDP payments 
to gross revenue decreases the coefficient of 
variation of revenue by 5 percent, but adding the 
ACR payment instead reduces the coefficient of 
variation by 14 percent. Barnes County, with its 
low correlation of state yield with national yield, 
receives substantial risk-reduction benefits from a 
payment that explicitly addresses state yield.
10 
  Figure 1 graphs the density functions of the 
same simulated data from Table 4 for the low 
price scenario. In the figure, the ACR density 
function demonstrates that it compensates for 
most of the downside revenue loss events (as it 
does in the high price scenario as well, but which 
is not shown for the sake of brevity). Not all the 
downside revenue losses can be captured given 
                                                                                    
10 The conclusions in the main text generally apply to the results in 
Table A1 in the appendix that use the alternative block bootstrap 
approach for generating the yield density. One difference is that in 
Table A1, for Logan County in the low price scenario, the difference 
between the two programs in the coefficient of variation of revenue, at 
9 versus 10 percent, is smaller than in Table 4. Plus, median revenue 
for Logan County with ACR is significantly lower than with CCP+ 
LDP. These results amplify the conclusion in the main text, which is 
that for Logan County in the low price scenario, the CCP+LDP 
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Figure 1. Probability Density of Revenue per Acre (pre-planting price for 2006) 
Note: The cash price at pre-planting in 2006 is $2.07/bu.; the price scenario uses a revenue pre-planting price that would have 
been calculated for 2006, or $2.58/bu., which is the average of the 2004 through 2006 February values of the December futures 
contract ($2.83, $2.32, and $2.59, respectively). 60    April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
that payments are made based on state and not 
local yields. For the low price scenario in Logan 
County (the second graph in Figure 1), the shift to 
the right in mean revenue given CCP+LDP pay-
ments is high enough, and the related reduction in 
downside risk is low enough, that the Logan pro-
ducer would appear to be unlikely to prefer ACR 
over CCP+LDP in this case. For the Barnes 
County farmer, the income-augmenting effect of 
the CCP+LDP is small relative to its effect in 
reducing downside risk. Without knowing the 
farmer’s expected utility function, it is hard to 
predict which program the farmer would prefer. 
Of course, at high prices (Table 4), there is no 
choice between the price-based programs and 
ACR revenue payment. The choice between pro-
grams would simply be based on the farmer’s 
price expectations and differences in fixed pay-
ments under ACR and under the traditional pro-
gram option. 
  This analysis over-estimates the risk reduction 
benefits of both LDP+CCP and ACR to the extent 
it is reasonable to assume a representative county 
farmer. A farm-level dataset of Illinois farmers 
covering 1996 through 2005 shows the correla-
tion of farm-level yield in Logan County with 
county-level yield to be relatively high at 0.73. 
  The ACR uses state-level yields to calculate 
payments. However, administrative costs could 
be reduced by calculating payments at the na-
tional level. Alternatively, payments could be 
more closely tailored to farm revenue by making 
them use county yields, but at a high administra-
tive cost for the government. Table 5 shows the 
impacts on revenue per acre of making ACR pay-
ments based on national or county yield meas-
ures. The change in coefficient of variation in 
moving from a national yield-based payment to 
the state-level payment is greater for Barnes 
County, where the decrease in coefficient of 
variation with the national payment is 7 percent 
but is 31 percent with the state payment, while for 
Logan County the values are 15 and 28, respec-
tively. Moving to a county yield based ACR pay-
ment provides a substantial additional decrease in 
the coefficient of variation of revenue. This im-
pact is similar for both counties given that their 
correlation of county yield with state yield is 
similar.
11 
                                                                                    
11 The conclusions regarding Table 5 also apply to Table A2 in the 
appendix, which uses the alternative block bootstrap result for generat- 
  Notwithstanding the reduction in coefficient of 
variation of revenue that the county-yield version 
of the ACR brings to the Logan County producer, 
if that producer had the choice, he might prefer an 
ACR payment based on the national-level yield 
aggregation. In this case, the lower level of preci-
sion in targeting yield appears to produce signifi-
cantly higher mean revenue, albeit with increased 
risk of lower payment events, as suggested by the 
lower bound of the 90 percent confidence interval 
in Table 5. 
  In summary, among the key points of this sec-
tion are (i) when prices are low relative to loan 
rates and target prices, ACR will likely result in 
significantly lower probability of high budgetary 
outlays than the LDP+CCP combination, but (ii) 
even when prices are relatively low, farmers in 
states with low correlation of yield with national 
average yield may prefer ACR payments to 
LPD+CCP in terms of the trade-off between 




The ACR revenue payments reduced the coeffi-
cient of variation of revenue for our representa-
tive farmers in North Dakota and Illinois more 
than did the existing support programs. However, 
the ACR provided a greater benefit in terms of 
reducing the coefficient of variation of revenue to 
the North Dakota farmer. This difference in im-
pacts on the coefficient of variation confirms the 
intuition that price-based support does a better job 
of addressing yield variability for farms whose 
yields are highly (and positively) correlated with 
the national average, as would be the case for the 
representative Illinois farmer, than it would for 
the representative farmer whose yield is not 
highly correlated with national average yield. 
Farmers outside the production regions that drive 
the national average (the heartland in the case of 
corn) are less likely to be able to benefit from the 
“natural hedge” between price and yield. As the 
ACR directly targets state yield, it provides farm-
ers in peripheral production regions better pro-




ing the yield density. The decreases in coefficient of variation in the 
last column of Table A2 are similar to those in Table 5. Cooper  Payments under the Average Crop Revenue Program   61 
 
 
Table 5. Impacts of the ACR Payments on Total Revenue per Acre of Using Different Yield 
Aggregations in the Payment Rate Calculation (higher price scenario) 
  Total Revenue per Acre 











BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA 
Gross revenue  427  418  115  0.270  241  637   
National ACR + GRev   451  443  113  0.251  267  657  7 
State ACR + GRev  467  444  86  0.185  364  639  31 
County ACR + GR  478  453  72  0.150  414  637  44 
LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
Gross revenue  639  640  82  0.128  496  769   
National ACR + GRev   675  680  74  0.109  530  785  15 
State ACR + GRev   673  668  62  0.093  589  779  28 
County ACR + GRev  675  663  48  0.072  633  769  44 
Note: The cash price at pre-planting is $3.97; the February price of the December futures contract is assumed to be $4.27. In this 
higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting price is $4.58, which is the average of the hypothetical $4.27 and the 2007 and 
2008 February futures values ($4.06 and $5.40, respectively). 
 
 
  However, the explicit consideration of yield in 
the ACR payment has a flip side for those farmers 
in the heartland. As the ACR payment rate auto-
matically compensates for the inverse correlation 
between price and yield, it does not provide the 
systematic over-compensation for a price de-
crease or systematic under-compensation for a 
price increase that farmers in the core production 
regions face with the price-based programs. For 
our low price scenario for the Illinois farmer, the 
over-compensation effect appears to dominate the 
under-compensation effect to the extent that the 
Illinois farmer would likely prefer the price-based 
support over the ACR at low prices in spite of its 
better risk-reduction effects. For the North Da-
kota farmer, however, even for the low expected 
price scenario, the higher mean revenue under 
traditional program payments may not be suffi-
cient to compensate for the higher variance of 
revenue associated with these payments. 
  At prices high enough that price-based pro-
grams provide little prospect of a payment, the 
ability to receive the ACR revenue payment 
would naturally be preferred to receiving CCPs 
and the marketing loan benefits. If the farmer 
believes that the high price scenario will last till 
the end of the current Farm Act cycle, then the 
CCPs and the marketing loan programs become 
largely irrelevant to the farmer decision to elect 
ACR. In such a case, the farmer will simply have 
to weigh the likely loss in direct payment in re-
turn for the ACR fixed $15 per acre payment plus 
the ACR revenue payment. 
  Market-based revenue payments such as the 
ACR can raise fears of the prospect of high budg-
etary outlays if crop prices were to fall from their 
previous high levels, but stay at levels still too 
high to produce CCP and marketing loan benefits. 
In February 2008, corn was high enough to pre-
clude any significant probability of CCP pay-
ments or marketing loan benefits for 2009, at cur-
rent loan rates and target prices. In the short run, 
ACR could have the potential for greater budget-
ary outlays than the price-based programs. How-
ever, as farming is a competitive industry, even if 
the current price regime continues well into the 
future, then costs will increase sufficiently to 
bring average economic profits back to zero. If 
so, the government could be under considerable 
pressure to raise loan rates and target prices, and 
if it did, the magnitude of differences between 
outlays under the programs could be reduced. 
  In a related note, simply allowing the producer 
a choice between ACR and the traditional suite of 
payment programs is itself not without additional 
potential budgetary costs to the government. In 62    April 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
particular, if there turns out to be a substantial 
difference between payments under the two ap-
proaches in a crop year, it could be possible that 
producers who choose the option with the lower 
payment may lobby the government for a rule 
change to permit them to switch back to the other 
option for that year. If such lobbying were suc-
cessful, the result would be higher budgetary ex-
penditures than if an optional program were not 
available. Notwithstanding these issues, a benefit 
of the ACR or other similar revenue-based pay-
ment programs is that they may help direct future 
Title I support in directions that are more consis-
tent with economic principles embodied in mak-
ing revenue the basis for payments. 
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Table A1. Impacts of Commodity Payments on Revenue per Acre under the Two Price 
Scenarios—Block Bootstrap Used to Generate Yield Densities 
  Total Revenue per Acre 












Interval (lower, upper) 
A. BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA 
Gross revenue  2.07  227  232  69  0.305  --  114  349 
CCP+LDP + GRev  2.07  259  255  72  0.278  9  144  402 
ACR + GRev  2.07  243  237  53  0.220  28  169  349 
Gross revenue  3.97  435  444  132  0.305  --  219  669 
CCP+LDP + GRev  3.97  No impact            
ACR + GRev  3.97  476  465  96  0.202  34  324  669 
B. LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
Gross revenue  2.07  332  329  49  0.146  --  246  417 
CCP+LDP + GRev   2.07  388  405  52  0.133  9  250  388 
ACR + GRev   2.07  336  331  44  0.132  10  280  417 
Gross revenue  3.97  637  631  93  0.147  --  472  800 
CCP+LDP + GRev   3.97  No impact            
ACR + GRev   3.97  669  666  75  0.111  23  585  808 
Notes: “GRev” is gross revenue per acre. 
  When the cash price at pre-planting in 2006 is $2.07/bu., the price scenario uses a revenue pre-planting price that would have 
been calculated for 2006, or $2.58/bu., which is the average of the 2004 through 2006 February values of the December futures 
contract ($2.83, $2.32, and $2.59, respectively). 
  When the cash price at pre-planting is $3.97, the February price of the December futures contract is assumed to be $4.27. In 
this higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting price is $4.58, which is the average of the hypothetical $4.27 and the 2007 and 
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Table A2. Impacts of the ACR Payments on Total Revenue per Acre of Using Different Yield 
Aggregations in the Payment Rate Calculation (higher price scenario)—Block Bootstrap Used to 
Generate Yield Densities 
  Total Revenue per Acre 











BARNES COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA 
Gross revenue  435 444 132  0.305  219  669   
National ACR + GRev   452 462 129  0.286  230  681  6 
State ACR + GRev  476 465  96  0.202  324  669  28 
County ACR + GR 
487 460  82  0.169  411  669  45 
LOGAN COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
Gross revenue  637 631  93  0.147  472  800   
National ACR + GRev   663 659  85  0.129  476  810  12 
State ACR + GRev   669 666  75  0.111  585  808  24 
County ACR + GRev  680  661  54  0.081  629  800  45 
Note: The cash price at pre-planting is $3.97; the February price of the December futures contract is assumed to be $4.27. In this 
higher price scenario, the revenue pre-planting price is $4.58, which is the average of the hypothetical $4.27 and the 2007 and 












   